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In many cases which have arisen of late, dealing
with the organization of corporations, it has been urged
that although the incorporators fully complied with the
letter of the incorporating statute they evaded the real
spirit of the act. ThiB question has been brought up
most frequently in those two classes of corporations. com-
monly designated as "One Man Companies", and Tramp Cor-
porations", and consequently they have been very largely
responsible for this much talked of evasion of the spirit
of the corporation laws. As these two classes offer
the best examples of this so-called evasion, they will be
taken as the basis of this thesisand will be discussed
in turn.
ONE MAN CORPORATIONS.
The growing tendency towards a corporate form of
business in every branch of industry has been due primari-
ly to the lightened individual risk upon those persons
operating in this manner. The constant endeavor by all
classes of concerns, both large and small, to avail them-
selves of this limited liability has given rise of late to
a class of corporations commonly known as "One Man Com-
panies". As was said by Lord Macnaghten, this is a tak-
ing nickname but quite misleading.
By a one man company is meant a corporation in which
nearly all the stock of the concern is in the hands of one
person, the other shareholders acting merely as dunmies in
order to comply with the statutory requirement as to the
number of incorporators. Such a corporation, it has been
urged, is a mere scheme to enable a single individual to
carry on business in the name of a corporation with limited
liability contrary to the true intent and meaning of the
statute.
That the motive of the incorporators in thus organ-
izing a corporation is to enable a single individual to
carry on business with linited liability, cannot be denied.
Still a corporation is a distinct legal entity, complete
and apart from its shareholders, and its validity is not
subject to attack because of the motives of the parties
in availing themselves of the corporation laws. If, there-
fore, the validity of a one man corporation which has comp-
lied with all the provisions of an incorporating act may
be attacked, it must be shown that there was an intention
on the part of the legislature to refuse the privileges
of the statute to such a company. What the legislature
intended can only be determined by the express words of the
statute or by reasonable and necessary implication thererrom.
4.
Where, thena statute provides that a certain number of
persons may form a corporation, the only qualification for
membership bei-g the ownership of one share of stock, and
the words of the act in no way limit the number of shares
for which one -cerson may subscribe, it is difficult to
discover any intention on the part of the legislature, ex-
press or implied, to prevent a one man company from in-
corporating under the statute.
The question of the validity of a so-called one
man company seems to have first been raised in the case
of SALOMON V.SALOMON & CO.39 ,J TL .22. In
that case the appellant, Aaron Salomon,for some thirty
years had carried on business, on his own account, as a
leather merchant and wholesale boot manufacturer. The ap-
pellant decided to turn his business into a limited com-
pany. The respondent company was therefore formed with
a capital of 40,000.k, divided into 40,000 shares of Iy,
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each, for the purpose of purchasing the appellantts busi-
ness. The business had been a prosperous one, and was
solvent at the time the co::iPany was formed., The subscrib-
ers to the memorandum of association were the appollant,
his wife, and five children, each subscribing for one
share, and all the terms of the sale being known to and
approved by the shareholders. The appellant afterwards
had 20,000 shares allotted to him for which he paid I- per
share from the noney he was to receive for the transfer
hke
ofNbusiness to the company. No shares other than the
20,007 were ever issued. 1I addition to the stock the
appellant received in pay-nent IO,000,kin debentures. The
appellant was a-pointed managing director of the company.
Sho2tLy after the company started there cane a great de-
pression in the boot and shoe business, and it became ne-
cessary to borrow money to carry on the business. Salo-
won had his debentures for I0,000tcancelled.,and fresh
6.
debentures to the same amount were issued to one Broderip
with consent of Salomon as beneficial owner, to secure the
repayment of a loan of 5000kwith interest at 8 per cent.
Default being made in the payment of interest on his deben-
tures, Broderip instituted an action (Reported as BF{DE-
RIP V.SALOMON & CO., 30 W.N.38) to enforce his security
against the assets of the company.
A liquidation order being made and a liquidator
appointed, it was found that after paying Broderip's debt
with interest the assets of the Com.pany would amount to
but I,0051.which was claimed by Salonon as the beneficialA
of the debentures. The liquidator lodged a defensein the
name of the company, to tile debenture suit in which he
counterclaimed against Salomon and Broderip, but which
counterclaim as amended asked a declaration that the
copany or its liquidator was entitled to be indemnified
by A.Salomon against the wholeA the company's unsecured
7.
debts, namelyI7,733fand that A.Salolion was not entitled
to make any claim against the assets until the 7733Ahad
been satisfied. Judge Vaughn X-illiars made an order for a
de~laration in the terms of the amended counterclai with-
out -:ahing any order on the original counterclaim.
Both parties appealed. Tle Court of A-,peals held
that the formation of the co:iDany was a mere schenie to en-
able A.Salomon to carry on business in the nse of the com-
pany with limited liability contrary to the true intent
of the Companies Act of 1862, and dismissed the appeal
declining to make any order or the original counterclaim.
(Reported as *RODERIP V.SALOMONIS95,2 Ch 323.)
F-'om this order the appellant appealed, and the comp-
any brought a cross appeal against so much of it as de-
clined to make any order on the original counterclaim.
Broderip having bedr paid dropped out. The House of Lords
reversed the decision of the lower court holding that no
8.
intention of the legislature prejudicial to the company
could be read into the statute, and that being duly formed
under the Companies Act,as soon as it was registered it
became a corporate body capable of exercising all the func-
tions of an incorporated company regardless of the fact that
nearly all the stock was in the hands of one man and the
company virtually under his control.
A distinction mast be noticed between cases like
Salomon vs. Salomon & Co. where the business purchased by
the corporation is solvent at the time and where there is
no intention to delay and hinder creditors, and those
cases such as Kellogg v.Bank, 46 Pac. Rp. 587 and Folsom &
Co.v. Detrick Fertilizer Co., 85 Md.,52, where an insol-
vent business is transfered to a one man corporation for
the purZose of defrauding creditors.
In Kellogg v.Bank, where an insolvent merchant
through the instrumentality of a corporation organized and
9.
controlled by himself sought to delay and hinder creditors,
the court said, "The incorporation seems to have been
little but a paper scheme devised in his own interest.
In such case the court 'cas clearly warranted in closely
scrutinizing the transaction, and declaring its real pur-
pose, notwithstanding the elaborate fabrications of char-
ters, by-laws, :nd paper transfers."
The decision reached in the cose of Salomon vs.Sal-
omon & Co. was of vital importance not only in determining
the status of that large class of similar corporations,
but also because the doctrine there laid down might readily
be extended to the analogous cases of incorporated part-
nerships. Suppose for instance that a partnership composed
of seven persons becomes incorporated, each partner receiv-
ing an amount of stock proportionate to his interest in
the original firm. As the corporation is composed entire-
ly of the original partners, the business goes on exactly
as before, all the profits going to the same persons
10.
and in the same proportions as previously. The only dif-
ference is that the individual liability of the members of
the cormpany is no longer unlimited. Had it been held
that oneAcoipanies were contrary to the true intent and
meaning of the statute and therefore evasions of the law,
the similar attempts of partnerships to operate with limit-
ed liability must likewise have been held to be frauds
and evasions of the law.
Saloraon v.Salomon & Co. seems to be the only case
in which a court has passed upon the question there de-
cided, either in England cr America. In all probability
the doctrine of that case would be followed if the question
should come before our courts. These one man companies
are constantly being formed in this country, r-nd have fre-
quently been before our courts, but their validity never
seems to have been challenged.
The cases of McElroy v.Llinn.Percheron Horse Co.,
II.
7T N.W.652, and Stokes v.Ne Jersey Pottery Co.,46 K.J.L.
237, are exanples of a large group of one man co fanies
that have been organized in the different states.
In MCElroy v.The Horse Co., the defendant corpora-
tion was organized by one Paine, five of his relatives,
rnd one of his enmployes, the statute of 1;isconsin requir-
ing seven persons to form a corpoaration, Paine owned
994 shares of stock and the other incorporators but one
share each.
In Stokes v.N.J.Pottery Co., the defendant company
was incorporated by one Cook and two relatives, the statute
of N.J. requiring but three incorporators. Cook owned
the entire capital stock except two shares held by the
other incorporators.
In both of these cases, while deciding other points,
th- court recognized the validity of tho corporation al-
though formed by just enough men to comply vrith the statute
12.
and though under the control of one man.
An argument frequently raised against one man com-
panies is that they are a fraud upon creditors. Creditors
may always consult the stock register of the company to
determine who are shareholders and the amount of their
holdings. In dealing with an individual, creditors
make inquiry into the state of his circumstances, and so if
they deal with a corporation it is their own fault if they
do not inquire into the nature of the articles of incorpor-
ation and look through the register of stock.-holders. If
strangers, no misrepresentations being made, choose to
deal with a company without inquiry, they have no right
to complain when it turns out that the shareholders are
under no personal liability, or that practically all the
stock is in the hands of one person.
There is a difference between an attempt to create one
person a corporation under a statuteand the purchase in gooi
13.
faith of all the stock by one person after the corporation
has been created. The decisions are in harnony in hold-
ing that the concentration of the stock of a corporation
in the hands of a single owner does not destroy the cor-
porate franchises nor work a dissolution of the corpora-
tion.
Newton Mfg.Co. v. White, 42 Ga.148.
Swift v. Smith,65 Md.,428.
Louisville Banking Co v.Eisenman 94 Ky.83.
Though there is in no state a statute authorizing
a single individual to form himself into a corporate body
and thus change his status and liabilities in business
transactions, the legislature ..ay if,it sees fitand there
are no constitutional restrictions, grant a charter as a
private business corporation to one man alone and leave it
optional with him whether he will associate other persons
with him or have succession without so doing.
14.
Penobscot Boom Corporation v. La-ison 16 Me.,22
Day v. Stetson, 8 Greenleaf (Me) 365.
In England I, 000,000,000,.are invested in corpora-
tions, whlile it has been estimated that the wealth held by
corporations in tho United States equals in value four-
fifths of the entire property of the country. Even if
it were adnitted that one man coirpanies are contrary to
the true intention of the incorporating statutes, there
is a question whether , wuith such a vast amount of capital
invested in corporations, it 7:ould be good public policy
for the legislature to endeavor to defeat such concerns
when thereby they would curtail the facilities for the
formation of corporations and embarass their administration.
I5.
TRAMP CORPORATIONS.
It has been said that, "As water naturally flows down
hill so capital flows to points where the greatest returns
may be secured, and where the corporation laws under which
it may act are most favorable to it." Wheretherefore,a
state is unduly hostile or exacting in its requirements from
corporations, it is avoided by business enterprises, and
charters are taken out in those states in which the lightest
liability is placed upon the stockholders and the lightest
taxation upon the corporation. New Jersey and West Vir-
ginia are examples of these states which hold out special
attractions for the organization of corporations, their
laws apparently being framed for the special purpose of al-
lowing corporations of their creation to do business else-
where. As many of these corporations have no
16.
domicile or fixed place of business in the state w1phre
they are created, they have been dubbed ",tramp corpora-
tions" by those who.urge that this form of organization
is an evasion and fraud on the law.
In considering this subject it will be necessary to
look at,
(I) The right of a corporation to do business
outside the state of its creation.
(2) The right of a corporation to do ALL its
business outside the state of its creation, where the in-
corporators are citizens of the state of incorporation.
(3) The right of a to do ALL its business out-
side the state of its creation, where the incorporators
are not citizens of the state of incorporation, but of the
state where the business is to be carried on.
It is a well settled principle that tho laws
17.
of a state can have no binding force outside the territor-
ial liits azd jurisdiction of th3 state enacting them.
As a corporation is a creature of the laws of the state
creating it, it cannot migrate into anotherstate and exer-
cise its franchises there without the consent of the leg-
islature of that other state, express or implied.
While a state has the powTer to exclude foreign corporations
from its territory, no such intention will be implied.
On the other hand, by virtue of the comity which obtains
between sovereign states, foreign corporations are permitted
to exercise their powers within a state, unless such exer-
cise of powers is prohibited by positLve law, or is con-
trary to the public policy of the state, or prejudicial
to its interests.
In the case of BANK OF AUGUSTA V.EARLE, 13 PET.592,
Mr.Chief Justice Taney delivering the opinion of the court
said, " We think it well settled, that by the law of comity
18.
among nations, a corporation created by one sovereignty
is permitted to make contracts in another, and. to sue in
its courts; and that the sama law of comity prevails among
the several sovereignties of this Union. The public and
well known, and long continued usages of trade; the gen-
eral acquiescence of the states; the particular legisla-
tion of some of them, as well as the legislation of Congress;
all concur in proving the truth of this proposition."
And again in CHRISTIAN UNION V. YOUNTIOI U.S.,356,
it was said by Mr.Justtce Harlan that, " In harmony with
the general law of comity obtaining among the states com-
posing the Union, the presumption should be indulged that
the corporation of one state, not forbidden by the laws
of its being, may exercise within any other state the gen-
eral powers conferred by its own charter,unless it is pro-
hibited from so doing either in the direct enactments of
the latter state, or by its public policy, to be deduced
19.
from the general course of legislation, or fro-- the set-
tled adjudications of its highest court."
From these decisions, and many others which might
be cited, it appears to be well settled that a corporation
created in one state may carry on busihess in another state,
provided it is not prohibited from so doing by the latter
state, and provided it acts within the scope of the powers
granted by its charter,
II. rhen it is said that a corporation may engage
in business beyond the borders of the state of its creation,
the question at once suggests itself is there any limit
to the extent to which such a business may be carried on
outside the state? The courts have notas a general rule,
attempted to fix any such limitation; a-d there would
seem to be no good reason vhy -'f a corporation may carry
on the greater part of its operations in a sister state,
20.
it may not so conduct its entire business.
In referring to a corporation as carrying on all
its business outside the state, only such business is
meant as is usually dote by the directors or other agents
of the concern1 and not that business of a corporate nature
which must be done by the incorporators, such as the elec-
tion of officers etc. Unless other ise provided in the
corporation's charter, acts of this corporate character
are always required to be performed within the state of
incorporation.
ere a corporation is given power by its charter
to engage in cornercial enterprises outside the state, no
prohibition is implied on the right to transact a similar
business irithin the state. If a state refuses to recognize
a corporation of its own creation, no rule of comity rc'r'ires
other states to recognize it. This proposition is well
illustrated in the case of LAND GRANT CO. V.COM'RS OF
21.
COFFEY COUNTY, 6 KAN.,245, where the state of Pennsylvania
empowered the corp oration to do business anywhere except
in Pennsylvania. Ini ref asing to recognize the corporation
the court said, uAt the very creation of this supposed
corporation its creator spurned it from the land of its
birth, as illegitimate and unwot'thy of a home among its
kindred., and sent forth a wanderer on foreign soil. No
rule of comity will allow one state to spawn corporations
and send them forth into other states to be nurtured, and
to do business there, when said first mentioned state will
not allow them to do business within its own boundaries.,
Ifhowever, a corporation organized to do business
outside the state is not restricted from engaging in a sir-
I-lar business at home,if it 3ees fit, the weight of author-
ity seems to be that it nay carry on all its business out-
side the state of its creation.
The leading case in New York on this point is
22.
IERRICK V. VAN SANTVOORD, 34 N.Y.208. A corporation
was formed in Connecticut by citizens of that state for
the purpose of carrying on the business of navigation
wholly in New York. In this action brought in New York
it was sought to hold the defendant, a member of this corpo-
ration, liable as a partner. In delivering the opinion
of the court, Judge Porter said., 1 11o law of New York
has imposed such liability on the members of foreign cor-
porations, as a condition to the exercise here of rights
derived from other governments, and recognized by the
rules of general comity.
The theory on which the Suprene Court held the de-
fendant, Van Santtoord, liable was, that he was a member
of an absconding corporatiol; that it had migrated from
Connecticut to New York; and that by such migration it
had lost its corporate character. In those views we do
notconcur. A corporation's donmicile is the legal juris-
23.
diction of its origin, irrespective of the residence of its
officers or the place where its business is transacted.
It retains that domicile until it ceases to exist; and its
existence continues within the linits assigned for its
duration, so long as it cormlies with the requirements of
its charter and with the conditions imposed by the state
laws, maintains its corporate succession by elections in
the proper jurisdiction, and continues to e.-ercise its
franchises under a grant which has neither been irmpeached
or revoked..
The first of a line of Ohio cases laying down a
doctrine similar to that of the UTew York case just cited
was HANNA V. INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CO.,23 OHIO-ST.622.
The court said in that case speaking of the defendant coy,,-
pany, a corporation organized in Pennsylvania by citizens
of that state with power to carry on business within or
without the state, but which had done all its business in
24.
Ohiomerely maintaining its organization in Pennsylvania,
0 The question is simply, whether a corporation authorized
by its charter to do business both at home and abroad, and
which, after due organization at home commences its foreign
business first, has a legal existence as a corporation.
TVe answer that it has. The life of a corporation dates
from its organization, and not fromj the time it begins to
do business; and the insertion in its charter of a power to
act outside the state of its creation does not invalidate
the charter. The com-oany was a legal corporation in
Pennsylvania as soon as organized there, and -,it.out com-
mencing business there.a
In the later case of NEWBURG PETROLEUM CO. V vT;ARE,
27 OHIO ST. 343, the court said in discussing whether a
corporation formed under the laws of IJew York by citizens
of lTew York and carrying bn its business in Ohio was a
fraud on the laws of Ohio, "The plaintiff by virtue of
25.
organization in due manner had an actual existence in New
York so soon as it was duly organized and a permissive
existence in Ohio so soon as it counenced business in Ohio.
rher. Ohio interposes by legislation to prohibit the intro-
duction of this kind of labor and capital into the state,
it will be timge enough to declare the organization of such
companies as the plaintiff a fraud upon our laws and our
public policy.",
The question again .rose in BANK V.LOVEL: 2 CIN.
(OHIO) 397. A corporation u as organized in Kentucky
to do business in Ohio. The plaintiff claimed the
corporation ought not to be recognized as it ,ras a fraud
upon the laws of Ohio. The Court held that, " If a
company keeps an office in the state creating it, and M1AY
do business there, though very little as compared with the
buisiness expected to be done in Ohio, such a body, we
think, should' be recognized in Ohio as a corporatior
26.
of the state creating it. "
In BANK V.1ALL, 35 OHIO ST. 158, where a corpora-
tion was organized in Kentucky to carry on a coal business
in Ohioit was said by the Court that the right of such
a corporation to do business in Ohio had been repeatedly
recognized and was well settled.
The Supreme Court of Texas passed upon this question
in FRANCO-TEXAN LAM D CO V. LAIGLE, 59 TEXAS 339, where a
corporation was formed in Texas with powrer to carry on all
its business in New York City and Paris, France. It was
said by the court that, uA private corporation whose
charter has been granted by one state cannot hold rLeetings
or pass votes, or have any legal existence in another state.
It must dwell in the place of its creation and cannot mi-
grate to another sovereignty. This prohibition as to
the perforMance of acts, outside of the state herechartered,
refers to acts of a strictly corporate character, such as
27.
must be discharged by the corporators themselves, such as
the original organization, the election of directors etc.
The better opinion is that the mere transaction of such
business as is usually done by the directors or other agents
*
of the body may be done as well without the state as within it
In RIO GRANDE CATTLE C0. V.BURNS,82 TEXAS 50,citi-
zens of Texas organized a corporation in Texas to deal in
cattle in the Republic of Mexico. The Court held that as
the corporate business was transacted in Texas, and the meet-
ings of the corporation were held there, any other business
might be transacted wholly without the state.
This question has several times come before the
Federal Courts. In COWELL v.SPRING CO.,100 U.S.55, a
corporation was formed in Pennsylvania to deal in land
" in the states and territories Vest of the Mississippi
River". The court said in deciding that a corporation
could thus carry on all its business outside the state of
28.
incorporation, "By the general comity which, in the
absence of positive directions to the contrary, obtains
through the states and territories of the United States,
corporations created in one state or territory are permit-
ted to carry on any lawful business in another state or
territory. If the policy of the state or territory
does not permit the business of the foreign corporation
within its limits , It must be expressed in some affirma-
tive Way."
IN NEW HAMPSHIRE LAND CO. V. TILTON: 19 FED REPS.
73., the plaintiff was a corporation organized under the
general laws of Connecticut for tho parpose of dealing in
land. It carried o- its entire business in New Hanp-
shire. It was held by the court that the plaintiff cor-
poration had the authority to hold and deal in lands in
New Hampshire even though it did no business in the state
where it was organized.
29.
IN PENNSYLVANIA C0. V. SLOAN, I BRADT. (ILL) 364,
it was said that a corporation of one state "lawfully
mayas they often actually do, remove their officers and
effects into another sovereighty, and there exercise their
functions and franchises. a
Corporations doing all their business outside the
state of their creation have also been recognized and their
legalityAin, MINN. GAS LIGHT CO. V. DENSLO., 46 MINN.I7I,
SALTMARSH V. SPALDING, 147 )ASS.,224, and WRIGHT V.LEE
2 S.D.,596.
The cases of EMPIRE MTILLS V. ALSTON GROCERY CO.,
15 S.W.RP 505, and ?.ARROLL V. ST.LOUIS,67 ILL ,508,are
very frequently cited in opposition to the doctrine as
laid down in the preceding cases. In each of these
cases foreigh corporations sought to carry on forms of
business contrary to the policy of the domestic states,
31).
as shown by express legislation, and the courts of the
domestic states refused to recognize the corporations.
These cases seem to be clearly distinguishable from those
previously cited, Where, as here, foreign corporations
are in opposition to the public policy of a state, affirm-
atively expressed, and prejudicia! to its interests, the
rules of comity place no obligations upon the domestic state
to recognize the corporations.
III. We have thus far seen that by the rules
of comity the business of a corporation nay be extended
beyond the boundaries of the incorporating atate, and that,
by the great weight of authority, a corporation organized
by citizens of the state of incorporation may engage in
business wholly without the state. The veritable"tramp
corporationu, and the one most vigorously attacked as a
fraud upon the law, that is, the company formed by citizens
3I.
of one state under the laws of another state to do business
in the former state, is yet to be considered.
Though persistently urgedthere appears to be no
solid ground* for making a distinction merely beeause
the incorporators of a foreign corroLution are citizens
of the domestic state. As 7.as said by Judge Peckham
in DEM AREST V.FLACK 128 N.Y. 235, "It seems to me that
every reason which urges upon us the recognition of foreign
corporations organized iaith the power to do business, and
composed of citizens of the foreign state, is equally po-
tent when the foreign corporation is composed of our own
citizens. It has always been supposed that a state should
at least deal as liberally with its own citizens as with
those of foreign states. If,therefore, we permit for-
cign citizens to come within our 1i--.ts in the for-. of a
foreign corporation organized with power to do business
here and recognized by us, why should we not permit our
32.
own citizens to avail themselves of the like privilge?
If we impose terms and conditions upon foreign corpora-
tions,as such, doing business here, those same terms and
conditions still and equally apply to a foreign corporation
when composed of our citizens, Why should they not be
placed at least upon~equality with the foreign citizens?"
In the case of DEMAREST V. FLACK, just cited, citi-
zens of New York incorporated a company in West Virginia
to operate toboggan slides in New York. The plaintiff
was injured on one of these slides and seeks to hold the
defendant, a member of the corporation, individually li-
able as a partner, claiming that this method of incorpora-
tion was merely man evasion of and fraud upon the law."
The court said, u There was no fraud or evasion of the
laws of West Virginia in thus becoming incorporated.
The formation of corporations thus composed and for the
purpose of doing their principal business outside the
33.
limtits of that state was contel:rplated .... thoae laws.
Where a corporation formed under another jurisdiction
a
comes here to do business ofAkind wrhich we permit to be
done by corporations, and .h,3reour lavs provide for in-
corporating individuals for the purpose of doing that
business, it is difficult to see how the tetms 'evasion'
and 'fraud' ca be properly applied to acts of our citizens
whereby they obtain incorporation in another state.",
A similar doctrine was laid down in the subsequent
case of LANCASTER V.AMSTERDAMI IIMPROVE1,1ENT CO.,I O N.Y.
576. The defendant corporation was organized in New
Jersey by citizens of New York for the purpose of deal-
ing in real estate in New York. The Court of Appeals,
Judge Gray writing the opinionsaid, "I- our citizens
are attracted to other jurisdictions for the purpose of
incorporation because of -ore favorable corporation or
taxation laws, I cannot see in that fact that they sh±ouldA
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be prevented froT:- employing here the coroorate capital in
the various channels of trade or manufacture. hPnat
legal difference is there, which the state can recognize,
if all the incorporators happen to be residents of tihis
state? The corporation is, nevertheless, a legal en-
tity, endowed by a sister state vith capacities and powers
and seeks our state as the field of its activity in the
conduct of its business enterprises.u
Although numerous enterprises are constantly ac-
quiring their corporate c...racter froA states in which
they do not expedt to ongage in business, and Ih which
none of the incorrPorators reside, the validity of such
corporations has com:e before the courts on but few occa-
s ions.
The (luestion ca:e up in tho Federal Courts in the case
of THE MOXIE NERVE FOOD CO. V.BAUI[BACH,32 FED.RP.205p
The plaintiff company was incorporated in Maine by citizens
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of Massachusetts to do business in Massachusetts. The
court held thatthe plaintiff company could thus engage
in business as it was valid in its creation, and was not
operating in Massachusetts contrary to any law of that
state.
A similar case came before the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island in OAKDALE MFG.CO V. GARST/ 18 R.I.484.
Citizens of Rhode Island obtained articles of incorpora-
tion in Kentucky to carry on business in Rhode Island.
The court said, uWhile the fact that citizens of Rhode
Island go to Kentucky for an act of incorporation is one
that naturally excites curiosity, if not suspicion, as to
the motives and good faith of the concern, we do not see
how we can refuse to recognize it. True the advantages
of yearly statements and liability of stockholders, given
to creditors under our statute are wanting; but that is a
matter for those who deal with the corporation to consider.
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We can hardly deny the right of a foreign corporation to do
business in this state, when our own statute provides for
corporations formed in this state to carry on business
out of the state. a
The leading case in opposition is HILL V.BEACH,12
N.J.E.31, Here a corporation validly incorporated in
New York was refused recognition by the New Jersey Court
on the ground that, "They were not a foreign corporation,
for it is perfectly manifest that the organization in
New York was a fraud upon the laws of that state." This
decision can hardly be reconciled with the generally estab-
lished doctrine of comity in recognizing foreign corpora-
tions7 unle _s something more is shown than the mere fact
of incorporation in New York to do business outside the
state. The New Jersey Court cannot question thd exist-
ence of a corporation validly incorporated in New York.
This case was decided in 1860 and is hardly in line with
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New Jersey's present liberal ideas on incorporation.
Another case often cited as opposed to the doctrine is
MONTGOMERY V.FORBESI48 US AS.249. In that case
a citizen of Massachusetts attempted to organize a corpora-
tion in New Hampshire to do business in Massachusetts.
The Massachusetts court refased to recognize the corpora-
tio¥, but soldly on the ground that the laws of New Hamp-
shire had never been complied with, and that no corporation
had ever come into existence. There was no tribunal
in New Hampshire to pass upon the validity of this cor-
poration. If the question ever arose it had to be de-
cided by comparing the incorporation papers with the stat.ute.
This the court did and decided that the defendant did not
comply Vrith the New Hampshire statute, and that no cor-
poration had ever been formed.
In the cases we have considered the party attacking
the tramp corporation has almost invariably designated it
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as a "fraud upon the law". By a fraud upon the law is
evidently meant a fraud upon the state, referring either
to the incoirporating state or to the state where the cor-
poration is to carry on business. It will be necessary,
therefore, to consider whether such a form of a corpora-
tion is a fraud either (a) upon the state of incorporation
or (b) upon the state where the business is to be carried
on.
(a) The statute frequently provides that a certain
number of the incorporators rrmst be residents of the state
of incorporation. But vihere there is no such requirement,
the tendency has been throughout all the states to con-
strue the statute as meaning that any persons may obtain
incorporation regardless of the place of their residence,
or of where the business is to be carried on. Under
this construction there is no wro gful use of the statutory
privilege, and consequently no fraud upon the incorporating
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state.
(b) As incorporation in one state gives no rights
outside that state, it is evident that there is no fraud-
upon the laws of a sister state. It is for this latter
state to say whether the corporation shall be admitted,
and if so upon what terms. It is this right of d dom-
estic state to regulate fareign corporations by imposing
limitaions and restrictions upon them, that has rendered
harmless those evils that would otherwise result if a
foreign corporation could make a dorestic state the prin-
cipal centre of its business operations wTithout being
subjected to control frohf that state.
Thus we see that the whole subject of tranp cor-
porations resolves itself into a question of comity.
Whatever the right of tie corporation at hoyae may be, the
question as tc whether it may venture berond the borders of
the state of its creation for the purpose of carrying on
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business is one of comity to be determined by the policy
of the state where it seeks to do business.
It is therefore submitted that a foreign corpora-
tion may carry on its business entirely or in part rithout
the state of its incorporation, unless such business is
contrary to the policy of the domestic state affirmatively
expressed; that it is ixmaterial whether the incorporators
of the foreign corporation are citizens of the foreign state
or the domestic state; and that the so-called tramp cor-
porations are neither a fraud on or evasion of the laws
of the domestic or foreign state.
